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I. INTRODUCTION 
South Carolina recently promulgated new guidelines regulating the 
State's consideration of requests by private marsh island owners to build 
bridges for vehicular access through publicly owned marsh and tidelands. 1 
Many thousands of these islands hug the South Carolina coast, but they are 
surrounded by tidelands subject to South Carolina's formidable public trust 
doctrine, which obligates the State to manage submerged lands and 
waterways for the benefit of the public? This piece evaluates the 
relationship between the public trust doctrine and the takings subtexe to the 
debate over the new guidelines - a relationship that has become particularly 
interesting in the aftermath of a key Supreme Court takings decision, 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,4 in which the public trust doctrine made a late-
breaking appearance on remand. 
1 S.C. CODE ANN. REGs. 30-12(N) (2006) (replacing the existing regulation declared invalid 
by the South Carolina Supreme Court for vagueness). The regulations were promulgated by 
the Ofl:ice of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM). See Ofl:ice of Ocean and 
Coastal Res. Mgmt.. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, available at 
http://www.scdhec.net/environment/ocrm (last visited Feb. 4. 2007). 
2 See Joseph L. Sax. The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention. 68 MicH. L. REv. 471 (1970). Traditionally, the common law doctrine has 
focused on protecting fishing and navigational values. although more modern articulations of 
the doctrine have also rendered protection for ecological. recreational, and scenic values 
associated with submerged lands. See. e.g.. Nat'! Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine 
County. 658 P.2d 709. 712. 728 (Cal. 1983). Because other pieces in this symposium issue 
provide such careful treatments of the public trust doctrine. this essay defers to these sources 
for a fuller exposition of the doctrine. See. e.g .. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman. Ecosystem 
Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN 
ENVTL. L.J. 223 (2006). See also Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical 
Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 
477 (2001). 
3 Two kinds of alleged takings have surfaced in the South Carolina Marsh Island debate: (1) 
takings alleged when people who believe they own islands discover that, under the state's 
expansive public trust doctrine. they actually belong to the state. see generally Op. S. C. 
Att'y Gen .. 2003 S.C. AG LEXIS 231 (Dec. 5, 2003) (advising that, absent clear and 
convincing evidence of a grant of ownership by the sovereign. the state presumptively owns 
the marshlands); and (2) takings alleged when people who clearly do own private islands 
contemplate being denied permission to build a bridge over public tidelands to access them, 
see Ellison Smith. Attorney. Smith Bundy Bybee & Barnett. Presentation at the University of 
South Carolina School of Law Southeastern Environmental Law Journal Symposium: 
Bridging the Divide: Public and Private Interest in Coastal and Marsh Islands (Sept. 8. 2006) 
available at http://www.law.sc.edu/elj/2006symposium/ (last visited Feb. 4. 2006). This piece 
is exclusively concerned with the second category of alleged takings. 
4 Palazzolo v. State. No. 88-0297. 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5. 2005) 
(holding the public trust doctrine is a background principle of property law and can block 
development on tidal lands). remanded, Palazzolo v. State. 785 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2001), 
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After exploring the takings-related anxiety embedded in the South 
Carolina bridge controversy, this essay reviews the Palazzolo saga through 
its ultimate disposition on remand, and analyzes its significance not only for 
the marsh island bridge debate but for the broader array of land use 
controversies that involve wetlands, tidelands, and other submerged lands. 
Rhode Island's successful reliance on the public trust doctrine in defending 
the Palazzolo claim on remand - bolstered by a related analysis in McQueen 
v. South Carolina Coastal Councit- suggests that regulatory takings claims 
brought by disappointed bridge permit seekers are unlikely to succeed. Both 
decisions hold that the public trust doctrine forms part of the background 
principles of state law that inform private property owners' reasonable 
expectations about the potential uses of submerged lands.6 Because the 
property owner's "reasonable expectations" about development prospects 
are a central consideration in the legal analysis of a regulatory takings 
claim, 7 recognition that the public trust doctrine limits their formation 
regarding submerged lands strengthens the position of the state in this and 
many other land use controversies that pit environmental protection of 
wetlands and tidelands against opposing private property interests. 
II. TAKINGS ANXIETY AND THE SOUTH CAROLINA MARSH ISLAND BRIDGE 
CONTROVERSY 
The State of South Carolina is no stranger to the special vexations of 
managing fragile coastlands, having famously (and unsuccessfully) 
defended in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councit its ambitious 
Beachfront Management Act,9 which attempted to protect eroding coastal 
resources by curtailing development of private waterfront lands. 10 
Accordingly, the new marsh island bridge guidelines arrive amidst an 
already charged debate about the appropriate balance of public and private 
interests in the management of South Carolina's unique coastal lands. 
remanded. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). aff'g in part and rev'g in part. 
Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tarvares, 746 A.2d 707. (R.I. 2000). 
5 McQueen v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. ControL 540 U.S. 982 (S.C. 2003). 
6 Palazzolo v. State. No. 88-0297. 2005 RI. Super LEXIS 108 at *25 (RI. Super. Ct. July 5. 
2005); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal CounciL 580 S.E.2d 116. 119-120 (S.C. 1995). 
7 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City ofNew York. 438 U.S. 104. 124-25 (1978). 
8 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (requiring compensation whenever a state regulation eliminates 
all economically viable use of a parcel of private property). 
9 S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280 (1988) (current version available at S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-
280 (2006)). 
10 Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1008-1009. 
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A. South Carolina's Marsh Islands and the New Guidelines 
The South Carolina coastline pairs miles of ocean-fronting beach with 
some 3,500 marsh islands that buffer the mainland shore. 11 Many of these 
islands are privately owned, 12 but the prohibitive expense of bridge-building 
has ensured that until recently, only the largest and most developed coastal 
islands have been joined to the mainland by vehicular bridges. 13 However, 
the recent boom in coastal property values has shifted priorities among 
many island owners, who are increasingly seeking State permission to erect 
vehicular bridges that promise easier access and more profitable sales. 14 
The former guidelines - criticized as too strict by many disappointed 
permit seekers and too permissive by many disappomted neighbors15 - were 
invalidated in 2005 by the South Carolina Supreme Court, 16 which held 
them void for vagueness in failing to clearly establish which islands were 
subject to the regulations in the first place. 17 In the chaos that followed 
dissolution of what regulatory guidance had once existed, clarion voices 
were raised by stakeholders on all sides of the issue. 18 
11 See J. DAVID WHITAKER ET AL .. S.C. DEP'T OF NATURAL REs., AN ECOLOGICAL 
CHARACTERIZATION OF COASTAL HAMMOCK ISLANDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1 (2004) 
(cataloging the ecological value of South Carolina's marsh islands), available at 
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/id/DNR_Final_l_report_December.pdf (last visited Feb. 4. 2006); 
see also S.C. Dep't of Natural Res., COASTAL ZoNE AND MARINE ECOREGION TERRESTRIAL 
AND AQUATIC HABITATS 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.dnr.sc.gov/cwcs/pdflhabitat/CoastalZoneHabitat.pdf(last visited Feb. 4. 2006). 
12 See Saving the Marsh Islands. HERALD (Rock Hill). Nov. 23. 2004, at SA. But see New 
Safeguard for Marsh Islands. PosT AND COURIER (Charleston). Dec. 30. 2003, at lOA 
(reporting an opinion by the South Carolina Attorney General concluding marsh islands are 
presumptively owned by the state absent a specific title grant from the state). 
13 See generally Bo Petersen. Lawmakers Get a Fresh Look at Marsh Islands; Boat Tour an 
Effort to Push New Rules to Govern Development. PosT AND COURIER (Charleston). Mar. 7, 
2006, at Bl. 
14 See WHITAKERET AL .. supra note 11, at 1. 
15 Nancy Vinson. Dir. Water Quality and State Legislative Programs, Coastal Conservation 
League. Presentation at the University of South Carolina School of Law Southeastern 
Environmental Law Journal Symposium: Bridging the Divide: Public and Private Interest in 
Coastal Marshes and Marsh Islands (Sept. 8. 2006) available at 
http://www.law.sc.edu/elj/2006symposium/ (last visited Feb. 4. 2006). 
16 S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 610 S.E.2d 482 
(S.C. 2005) (holding S.C. CODE ANN. REGs. 30-12 N (2005) void for vagueness). 
17 Id at 486 (holding that the guidelines. which governed bridge permits for ''small islands," 
failed to define adequately the qualifier ''small'"). 
18 See. e.g.. Insist on Island Protections. PosT AND COURIER (Charleston). Mar. 12. 2006, at 
AlO; Tommy Howard. Marsh Islands Legislation Pending. GEORGETOWN TIMES. Apr. 17, 
2006, available at 
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Coastal conservation advocates urged the State to limit bridge-building 
in the coastal zone as much as possible, fearing the establishment of a vast 
network of bridges that would fragment the tidelands and damage 
vulnerable features of the coastal ecosystem. 19 (After all, it was the 
precarious state of South Carolina's coast that had motivated the coastal 
management agency to take the drastic step of foreclosing all development 
on the now-famous oceanfront Isle of Palms parcel belonging to David 
Lucas.) 20 Meanwhile, property rights advocates urged the State not to 
further impede the realization of land owners' investment-backed 
expectations regarding valuable waterfront properties?1 (After all, Lucas's 
victory at the Supreme Court was considered a vindication of property 
owners' conviction that state regulation had already gone too far in 
burdening coastal landowners for the benefit of the general public.i2 Debate 
over the future direction of the regulatory guidelines was contentious, and 
the result uncertain. 23 
Forged in the clash of this contest, the new guidelines seek a renewed 
balance between these competing interests - one that provides meaningful 
protection for the important public commons associated with coastallands24 
while remaining vigilant on behalf of private property rights (or at least 
against further takings liability on the part of the State). The guidelines 
foreclose the possibility of bridges to all islands measuring less than one 
acre in area or lying either less than 100 or more than 1500 feet from 
shore. 25 Other claims are subjected to a balancing algorithm that considers 
the size of the island, its distance from shore, and other pertinent details 
http:/ /www.zwire.com/site/news.cfin?newsid= 16488698&BRD=2081 &P AG=461 &dept_id= 
385210&r±i=6 (last visited Feb. 4. 2006). 
19 See Restore Protections to Islands. PosT AND COURIER (Charleston). Mar. 5. 2005. at 12A; 
cf WHITAKER ET AL .. supra note 11. at 100 (cataloging the ecological values of South 
Carolina's marsh islands). On the basis of the rich biological diversity that exists on small 
marsh islands. the authors of the study urge policymakers that ''[i]slands should not be 
exempted from protection based upon size.·· Id 
20 Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1008. 
21See generally Bo Petersen. Marsh Island Bridges in Flux; House Panel on Tuesday 
Considers Controversial Rules. PosT AND COURIER (Charleston). Apr. 16. 2006. at B1; Jacob 
Jordan. Proposed State Rules at Center of Dispute Over Coastal Land. THE STATE 
(Columbia). Mar. 19. 2006. at F 1. 
22 See. e.g.. Gilbert Halverson. EditoriaL Radical Environmentalists Stepping All Over Bill of 
Rights. CAPITAL TIMES (Madison). Oct. 19. 1994. at 11A. 
23 Jordan. supra note 21. at Fl. 
24 See. e.g.. Ruhl & Salzman. supra note 2; Erin Ryan. New Orleans, the Chesapeake, and the 
Future of Environmental Assessment: Overcoming the Natural Resources Law of Unintended 
Consequences. 40 U. RicH. L. REv. 981 (2006). 
25 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(2) (2006). 
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suggesting either the potential for great ecological harm to public trust 
values if a bridge were erected or great personal harm to the owner if a 
sought-after permit were denied. 26 
The new guidelines imply that nearly 54% of all marsh islands (or 1,862 
separate islands) would be automatically denied bridge permits because they 
are smaller than one acre in size. 27 Of the remaining 46%, a sizeable 
percentage would also fail the requirements regarding distance from shore. 28 
Given the tenor of the debate preceding promulgation of the new guidelines, 
we might expect considerable unhappiness among potentially large numbers 
of island owners. Accordingly, there has been no shortage of speculation 
about the potential for new takings litigation along the South Carolina 
coast.29 
B. Takings Anxiety Along the Coast 
Still, one might fairly ask whether the "takings" question even properly 
arises in this context. The very nature of the government's action in denying 
permission for an island owner's proposed bridge is not suggestive of the 
classical regulatory taking, in which a government regulation denies an 
owner certain economically valuable use of her private property in service 
of some legitimate public purpose. The bridge guidelines don't even directly 
regulate an owner's use of her own land; rather, they address the way in 
which the State uses its land- i.e., whether to use public trust tidelands for 
the support of a bridge to a private island.30 And yet, anxiety about the 
takings dimension of the new guidelines emanates from all sides of the 
debate. 31 
26 Id 
27 See WHITAKER ET AL .. supra note 11. at 1 (noting that ''[t]here are approximately 3,467 
coastal islands ... [o]fthese islands. 53.7% are less than once acre'"). 
28 Richard Chinnis & Debra Hernandez. South Carolina Coastal Marsh Island Management 
Strategy, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH BIENNIAL COASTAL ZONE CONFERENCE. NEW ORLEANS, 
LA. at 3 (July 17-21. 2005) available at 
http:/ /www.csc.noaa.gov/cz/2005/CZ05 _proceedings_ CD/pdf%20files/Chinnis.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 4. 2006) (in a study of2.076 islands unprotected from development and presently 
without bridge access. finding that 44% (914) are greater than 1000 feet from shore. 10% 
(207) are less than 50 feet from shore. and 46% (955) are less than 1000 feet from shore and 
10% (207) of all islands are less than 50 feet from the shore). 
29 Interview with Nancy Vinson. Dir. of Water Quality and State Legislative Programs, 
Coastal Conservation League, in Columbia, SC (Sept. 8. 2006). 
30 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(l)(a) (2006). 
31 Nancy Vinson. Dir. Water Quality and State Legislative Programs, Coastal Conservation 
League, Henry McMaster. S.C. Attorney General, Ellison Smith. Attorney, Smith Bundy 
Bybee & Barnett. Carolyn Risinger Boltin. Deputy Comm'r. Ocean and Coastal Res. Mgmt. 
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Anxiety on the part of DHEC, the state agency that authored the new 
guidelines, is made evident by the precisely crafted language in key portions 
of the guidelines themselves. For example, project standards regarding 
"eligibility to apply for a bridge permit" highlight the tension between the 
public and private interests at issue, and have clearly been designed in an 
effort to balance both: 
The decision on whether to issue or deny a permit for a bridge to a 
coastal island must be made with due consideration of the impacts 
to the public trust lands, critical area, coastal tidelands and coastal 
waters, weighed against the reasonable expectations of the owner of 
the coastal island. 32 
The emphasized text is no accident; balancing public interests against "the 
reasonable expectations" of private landowners reflects a critical element of 
the general inquiry into whether a regulatory taking has occurred. 33 An 
exquisite sensitivity to such inquiries (perhaps acquired during the lengthy 
Lucas litigation), may well have played a role in the agency's decision to 
include that very language here. 
Meanwhile, island owners seeking permits under the new guidelines 
have exhibited strong expectations that they are indeed entitled to build 
bridges - expectations that, if violated, might create an impetus to sue for 
compensation.34 For example, one South Carolina newspaper reported on 
growing anxiety among island owners about the new guidelines in an article 
published a few months before they were promulgated?5 Concerned that he 
would not be able to bridge his small island to the mainland, Ted Mamunes 
argued that his island would become virtually valueless to him without a 
S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. ControL Presentations at the University of South Carolina 
School of Law Southeastern Environmental Law Journal Symposium: Bridging the Divide: 
Public and Private Interests in Coastal Marshes and Marsh Islands (Sept. 8, 2006) available 
at http://www.law.sc.edu/eW2006symposium/ (last visited Feb. 4. 2006) (all presentations 
noted concerns about takings). 
32 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(2)(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
33 Penn Cent. Transp. Co .. 438 U.S. 104 (setting forth the Supreme Court's principal test for 
determining whether a private owner may seek compensation under the Fifth Amendment for 
partial economic deprivations associated with a land-use regulation). In Penn Central. the 
Court held that the application ofNew York City's historic landmarks law did not constitute 
a compensable taking because the restrictions were aimed at benefiting the public welfare and 
permitted beneficial use of the property. !d. at 124. See also infra, text accompanying note 
116. 
34 Jordan. supra note 21. at Fl. 
35 Id 
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bridge, lamenting that "[i]t's useless to me if I can't get to it."36 Mamunes' 
choice of words here is as significant as DHEC's careful phrasing in the 
guidelines, since a government regulation that deprives an owner of all 
economic value is the very categorical taking established in Lucas.37 This is 
the famous Lucas "total wipeout" rule, 38 and given the South Carolina roots 
of the case, it's not surprising that it would be on the minds of both property 
owners and regulators in the State. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine a claim relating to the marsh 
island bridge guidelines ever falling within the ambit of the Lucas "total 
wipeout" rule. Although Mr. Mamunes doubtlessly feels as though his island 
would be useless without a bridge, it is almost certainly not the case. The 
new guidelines create a very different kind of regulatory hardship for marsh 
island owners than did the portions of the Beachfront Management Act 
challenged in Lucas.39 Even if a bridge permit is denied, the island can still 
be accessed by means other than automobile traffic. At minimum, islands 
are usually accessible by watercraft of some kind, and thus amenable to 
varying kinds of residential, retreat, and recreational purposes - foreclosing 
the requisite "total wipeout" of economically viable use that triggers 
automatic compensation under Lucas. But that is not necessarily the end of 
the issue. 
C. A Potential Claim under the Penn Central Balancing Test 
A disappointed and determined owner may nevertheless allege a taking 
under the "ad hoc" regulatory takings balancing test set forth in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,40 the standard means of 
evaluating "partial" regulatory takings that leave at least some economically 
viable use. In such cases, the plaintiff alleges that a state regulation so 
36 Id 
37 Lucas. 505 U.S. 1003 (ruling that application of the South Carolina Beachfront 
Management Act to a developer's coastal property that deprived him of all economic benefit 
constituted a taking requiring just compensation without regard to the public purposes served 
by the regulation). 
38 The court in Lucas set forth the ''categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be 
compensated." Id at 1026. Although Lucas established the ''total wipeout'" rule, the court in 
Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States was the first to use the phrase. 208 F.3d 1374, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) remanded to 58 Fed. Cl. 657 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (finding that the denial of 
a permit to fill lake bottom constituted a categorical taking, but on remand, finding that denial 
by the Army Corps. ofEngineers was for a valid navigational purpose). 
39 The Beachfront Management Act challenged in Lucas prohibited the developer from 
building any occupiable structure on any part of the beachfront parcel at issue. 505 U.S. at 
1008-09. 
40 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
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compromises private property rights that it warrants compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment even though possession remains with the owner.41 Under 
the three factors of the Penn Central test, courts consider: ( 1) the character 
of the government action, (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the 
owner, and (3)- as the new regulations anticipate- the extent to which the 
challenged regulation interferes with the "reasonable, investment-backed 
expectations" of the landowner. 42 
Even by this route, however, most takings claims would encounter high 
hurdles, especially under the first prong. Courts evaluate the character of the 
government action in considering its intrusiveness or unfairness with regard 
to the challenging landowner.43 The more the regulation appears to sirlgle 
out individual owners to finance a collective benefit (or effectuates a 
permanent physical invasion by third party interlopers44), the more likely it 
is to be held a taking. But the new bridge guidelines should easily survive 
scrutirly under this prong, as they neither single out individuallandowners45 
nor imply a physical occupation46 - nor, as aforementioned, do they even 
directly regulate the landowner.47 Although the guidelines can fairly be 
considered land use regulations, they circumscribe not the owner's use of 
privately owned land but the management decisions of the state on what is 
concededly public land.48 This point might well prove dispositive of the 
entire claim, exposing a pivotal weakness that even extraordinary showings 
under the other prongs might not overcome. Nevertheless, it is worth 
probing the arguments under the remaining two prongs, both to exhaust the 
claim and to explore the significance of the analysis for related takings 
claims involving submerged lands. 
We thus turn to the second consideration, which inquires into the 
economic impact of the regulation on the owner.49 Most challengers are 
unlikely to fare much better under the economic impact prong of the test, by 
which the likelihood that the regulation will be held a taking tracks the 
degree of economic loss suffered by the private owner.50 The more loss is 
suffered in comparison to what value remains, the more likely a court is to 
41 Id 
42 Id 
43 See. e.g .. United States v. Causby. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
44 See. e.g. Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp .. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
45 Penn Cent. Transp. Co .. 438 U.S. at 132. 
46 Id at 124. 
47 See discussion. supra Part II.B.; S.C. CODE ANN. REGs. 30-12(N)(1)(a) (2006). 
48 Penn Cent. Transp. Co .. 438 U.S. at 131. See also Ryan. supra note 24. 
49 Penn Cent. Transp. Co .. 438 U.S. at 124. 
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find a taking. 51 However, though the economic impacts of a permit denial 
may prove considerable (in that a bridged island might prove more 
profitable overall than an island without a bridge), the regulations leave 
considerable economic value in coastal islands that can still be accessed by 
means other than cars, demonstrated by the high market value of even those 
islands that lack bridge access. 52 As the Penn Central Transportation 
Company learned when it failed to win compensation for the opportunity 
loss of potential profits from a forbidden high rise office complex over 
Grand Central Station, takings law has never required that the government 
permit the most economically valuable use of land.53 That's why the 
economic impact analysis is closely intertwined with the final prong of the 
test, which considers the owner's reasonable, irlvestment-backed 
. 54 
expectatiOns. 
The "reasonable expectations" prong of the test considers whether an 
owner deserves compensation for the loss of a right to use her land in a way 
that she had reasonably anticipated and substantially relied on. 55 Clearly, it 
is the "reasonable expectations" prong of the test that so motivated DHEC 's 
careful phrasirlg of how the state should consider bridge permit 
applications. 56 And just as clearly, many coastal landowners are concerned 
about the extent to which the new guidelines might frustrate their 
expectations. 57 Everyone seems to expect that this part of the analysis could 
get tricky in application to the marsh island bridge controversy. But what, 
exactly, is a "reasonable" expectation? 
The "reasonable expectations" prong is the most interestirlg and also the 
most unsettled in the analysis, leaving important questions unresolved. First, 
51 Id 
52 For example. despite the lack of bridge access. the marsh island development Dewees 
Island advertises at substantial values for its remaining lots which range from $260,000 to 
$2.575.000. Dewees Island. http://www.deweesisland.com (last visited Feb. 4. 2006). 
53 Penn Cent. Transp. Co .. 438 U.S at 125 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 
592-93 (1962)) (using zoning laws as an example of a valid government action that prohibits 
the most economically beneficial use of the land); see also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning law upheld in spite of 75% diminution in value of real property 
caused by the zoning law). 
54 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124-25. 
55 Id. 
56 See S.C. CODE ANN. REGs. 30-12(N)(l)(a) (2006) (''The decision on whether to issue or 
deny a permit for a bridge to a coastal island must be made with due consideration of the 
impacts to the public trust lands. critical area. coastal tidelands and coastal waters, weighed 
against the reasonable expectations of the owner of the coastal island.'" (emphasis added)); 
see also Jordan. supra note 21. 
57 See Jordan. supra note 21. at Fl; see also discussion. supra Part II B. 
Fall2006] PALAZZOLO, THE PUBLIC TRUST, AND THE PROPERTY OWNER 131 
what is it that creates a reasonable expectation with which a challenged 
regulation might interfere? In later cases, the Court has suggested that an 
owner's expectations hinge on the "background principles" of a state's law 
of property and nuisance, 58 but what exactly does that mean? What does and 
doesn't count as part of the background principles of state law that inform 
reasonable expectations? It can't be that the background principles include 
all state laws, because if that were the case, no takings challenge could ever 
succeed on this prong of the analysis; the challenged law would simply be 
part of the set of principles that create an owner's legitimate expectations. 
But both statutory law and common law evolve over time, so how do we 
distinguish the subset legitimately informing an owner's reasonable 
expectations from the rest that don't? 
Perhaps the more fruitful question to ask is: what can legitimately 
destroy expectations that might have been reasonable under a previous state 
of affairs? Can any new law render a previously reasonable expectation 
newly "unreasonable" without effecting a taking? To take a popular 
example in this age of increasing concern over nationwide wetlands loss, 
what about a modern wetlands-protective statutory scheme that withdraws 
much privately owned coastal land from further development? As critical a 
natural resource management strategy as this might be, we can at least 
appreciate the frustration of a long-time coastal land owner who hears about 
the new law just as she raises a hammer to break ground on a new 
foundation. But what about a would-be developer that takes title to the 
restricted land after passage of the new wetlands law? Can he claim that the 
law interferes with his reasonable expectations for development in such a 
circumstance? Indeed, these are the very facts that attracted the Supreme 
Court's attention in another of its recent landmark takings decisions, 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 59 
Given the unfavorable analyses we would expect under the first two 
prongs of the Penn Centraf'0 balancing test, a plaintiff challenging the new 
marsh island bridge guidelines could only hope to prevail on the force this 
third prong. 61 But the recent aftermath of Palazzolo suggests that - to the 
58 Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1027-1030; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606. 626-30 
(2001). 
59 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606 (200 1 ). aff'g in part and rev 'g in part, Palazzolo 
v. State ex rei. Tarvares. 746 A.2d 707 (RI. 2000). 
60 Penn Cent. Transp. Co .. 438 U.S. at 124. 
61 As aforementioned. even the most powerful ''expectations'' argument might fail to 
overcome unfavorable analyses on the ''character'' and ''economic impact" prongs. 
Nevertheless. probing the ''expectations'' argument enables us not only to exhaust the claim 
but to explore the significance of the Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606. remand and 
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probable relief of the State and the likely disappointment of some 
landowners -the "reasonable expectations" prong will provide no haven. 
III. PALAZZOLO AND THE PROBLEM OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
Although Anthony Palazzolo originally brought suit in Rhode Island, 62 
the story of Palazzolo might be rightly described as beginning in South 
Carolina, with the Lucas decision. 
As aforementioned, 63 Lucas set forth the "total wipeout" rule requiring 
compensation whenever a regulation causes a landowner to lose 100% of all 
economically viable use of her land, regardless of the important social 
benefits that the regulation might confer. 64 The Lucas "total wipeout" rule 
can be understood as clarifYing the Penn Central analysis at the extreme end 
of the "economic impact" inquiry, directing that the court's consideration of 
the "character" and "expectations" prongs approaches zero whenever the 
economic impact inquiry points to a 100% loss by the owner. Still, Lucas 
preserved a key exception, indicating that even in such cases of total 
deprivation, there is no taking if the desired use prevented by the regulation 
is one that the owner never had the right to engage in anyway- for example, 
one that would create a public or private nuisance. 65 Although this 
reservation became known as the Lucas "nuisance exception,"66 it is really 
an inquiry into the "background principles" of state law that tell us whether 
the owner had the right to engage in the prohibited use to begin with67 - i.e., 
whether that right was ever a stick in the proverbial bundle that he acquired 
when he took title. 68 As such, we might better understand the nuisance 
McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council. 580 S.E.2d 116. decision on related takings challenges 
that implicate the public trust doctrine in South Carolina and elsewhere. 
62 Palazzolo v. State ex rei. Tavares. 746. A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000). 
63 See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
64 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003. 1030-31 (1992). 
65 Id at 1027-30. 
66 Jd at 1030. See Patrick Wiseman. May the Market do what Taking Jurisprudence Does 
Not: Divide a Single Parcel into Discrete Segments?. 19 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 269. 273-274 (2006) 
(discussing the new Lucas nuisance exception) and Gary Lawson. Katharine Ferguson & 
Guillermo A. Montero. "Oh Lord, Please Don't Let Me be Misunderstood!": Rediscovering 
the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks. 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 42-43 
(2005) (discussing the Rhode Island court's use of the Lucas nuisance exception in 
Palazzolo). 
67 Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1027-1030; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606, 626-630 
(2001). 
68 In other words. ''if the contested use was not one acquired by the owner at purchase, the 
takings claim must be rt:iected at the outset due to lack of a protected property interest." 
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exception as the Lucas "No Stick Taken" affirmative defense. But why is 
any of this relevant to Anthony Palazzolo? Because he arrived at the Rhode 
Island Superior Court claiming (albeit in a novel way) that he was the victim 
of a Lucas "total wipeout." 
Mr. Palazzolo owned waterfront real property, of which approximately 
80% were wetlands adjacent to a pond and the remaining 20% uplands 
overlooking the pond. 69 At the time that he took title to the parcel, a 
statewide regulatory program limited the filling and development of 
wetlands like those in the lowland portion of his parcel. 70 When he sought 
permission to develop both the upland and wetland parts of the property, he 
was granted permission to build two lots in the uplands portion but denied 
permission to fill the wetlands to make them suitable for residential 
development. 71 
Palazzolo claimed that the regulation preventing him from developing 
the wetland portion of his property constituted a "total wipeout" of the value 
of that lowland portion of the property, 72 raising interesting interpretive 
questions about the appropriate denominator in performing the total-wipeout 
analysis. 73 Palazzolo's attempt to cast his loss as a categorical taking under 
Lucas proved unsuccessful, 74 and his case would ultimately be decided as a 
partial taking claim under the Penn Central regulatory takings balancing 
test. 75 But the case that would bear his name may prove critical in fleshing 
out some of the more unsettled areas of both rules, such as the nature of 
"reasonable expectations" under Penn Central and the scope of the No Stick 
Taken defense under Lucas (at least regarding coastal development in states 
like Rhode Island and South Carolina). 
Michael Blumm & Lucus Ritchie. Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background 
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses. 29 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 321. 327 (2005). 
69 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. at 612-14 The facts presented here are simplified to 
re±1ect only those relevant to the ''reasonable expectations'' inquiry that is the subject of this 
discussion. An additional description of the Palazzolo property can be found in Palazzolo v. 
State ex rel. Tavares. 746 A.2d 707. 709. 710 (R.I. 2000). and Brief of Defendant-Appellees. 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. No. 98-333A (R.I. 1999). WL 34749043. 
70 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. at 614-615. 
71 Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares. 746 A.2d at 715. 
72 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. at 630. 
73 See. e.g.. Frank I. Michelman. Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law. 80 HARv. L. REv 1165. 1192 (1967). 
74 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. at 630-31. 
75 Palazzolo v. State. No. 88-0297. 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *34 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5. 
2005). 
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A. Palazzolo to the US. Supreme Court 
Palazzolo lost all the way to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which 
decided there had been no taking on the simple grounds that there had been 
no frustration of reasonable, investment-backed expectations. 76 In the Rhode 
Island high court's view, the wetlands regulations that had been in place 
when he took title prevented Palazzolo from forming any reasonable 
expectation that he would ever be able to develop his new lowland property 
in the way he had planned. 77 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that a regulatory takings 
claim is not necessarily barred for lack of reasonable expectations simply 
because the challenged regulation precedes the owner's title. 78 Otherwise, it 
reasoned, the state could immunize itself against future challenges simply by 
passing a broad set of new legal restrictions and waiting for title in the 
affected properties to pass over time. 79 Remanding back to the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court for final determination,80 the Court advised that the 
appropriate inquiry concerns reasonable expectations as against the 
"background principles" of the State's law of property and nuisance.81 
And yet this answer leaves us adrift amid the continuing uncertainty 
about what qualifies as the relevant "background principles" that inform 
reasonable expectations. Apparently, the modern Rhode Island wetlands 
regulation did not - but then how far back in time must we look to find 
them? As some commentators have asked, must we go all the way back to 
the common law in 1789?82 Unlikely, since even Lucas acknowledged that 
background principles might evolve over time, 83 suggesting that they are not 
simply frozen artifacts from the time of a state's entry to the union. 84 But if 
76 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 616-17. 
77 Id at 616. 
78 Id at 632. Palazzolo also addressed important takings questions regarding conceptual 
severance (on remand). Palazzolo v. State. 2005 Rl Super. LEXIS 108 at *34-49, and 
ripeness. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. at 616-625, but these are not relevant for the 
purposes ofthis discussion. 
79 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 628-30. 
80 Id at 630. 
81 Id at 626. 629; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
82 Many commentators have asked this question. and most have answered in the negative. 
See. e.g.. Blumm & Ritchie. supra note 68; J.B. Ruhl. The Background Principles of Natural 
Capital and Ecosystem Services-Did Lucas Open Pandora's Box? (Fla. State Univ. Pub. 
Law Research Paper No. 214) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c±in?abstract_id=928656 (last visited Feb. 4. 2006). 
83 Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1031 (observing that ''changed circumstances may make what was 
previously permissible no longer so'"). 
84 See. e.g.. Blumm & Ritchie. supra note 68. 
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principles can change over time, but modern legislative enactments don't 
count - how do we define the operative set? Palazzolo thus raised new 
questions about the Lucas rule without answering the persisting old 
question: how do we know whether an owner's expectations are 
reasonable? 
B. Palazzolo on Remand to the R.I Courts 
After receiving Palazzolo on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Superior Court 
where the original bench trial had been held with instructions to examine 
Palazzolo's claim under the principles established in Penn Central. 85 
Although the Rhode Island Superior Court's final decision does not resolve 
the more general reasonable expectations quandary, it does provide 
meaningful guidance for land use controversies involving submerged lands 
by clarifYing a critical state law "background principle." Without answering 
the ultimate "what counts?" question, the court resolved that at the very 
least, the background principles of state law do include the public trust 
doctrine, and that the public trust doctrine can legitimately foreclose 
reasonable expectations for development that would imperil trust values. 86 
On remand, the Rhode Island courts applied the Supreme Court's Penn 
Central and Palazzolo analyses and affirmed the original conclusion that 
there had been no taking, explaining its conclusion on the basis of three 
separate grounds: public nuisance, a tentative "No Stick Taken" rationale, 
and a full Penn Central takings analysis. 87 
First, the court held that filling these wetlands would have constituted a 
public nuisance, 88 enabling the state's affirmative defense under Lucas that a 
regulation preventing a use that would have constituted a common law 
nuisance is not a taking.89 The public nuisance rationale is intriguing, but 
85 Palazzolo v. State. No. 88-0297. 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 (RI. Super. July 5. 2005), 
remanded. Palazzolo v. State. 785 A.2d 561 (RI. 2001). remanded, Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). aff'g in part and rev'g in part, Palazzolo v. State ex rei. 
Tarvares. 746 A.2d 707 (RI. 2000). 
86 Palazzolo v. State, 785 A.2d 561. 
87 Palazzolo v. State. No. 88-0297. 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108. 
88 Jd at *20-21 (finding the proposed development was expected to result in nitrogen levels 
elevated to a degree that would damage water quality and wildlife values associated with the 
pond. constituting an anticipatory public nuisance). 
89 Jd at *20 (citing Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1029) (reserving the question of whether the nuisance 
exception applies only in cases of ''total wipeout'" or whether it applies more generally to 
claims of partial regulatory takings such as this one). 
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relevant to the South Carolina inquiry only if a marsh island bridge could be 
held to constitute a public nuisance. 
Second, it held that Palazzolo had suffered no taking because Rhode 
Island's longstanding public trust doctrine makes clear that he never held the 
right to develop these wetlands in the first place.90 Recognizing that the 
public trust doctrine protects tidewaters for "commerce, navigation, and 
fishery,"91 U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishes that the precise 
contours of the doctrine are applied based on state law.92 The Rhode Island 
court determined that, both constitutionalll3 and at common law,94 Rhode 
Island's public trust doctrine prohibits the kind of development that 
Palazzolo sought. 95 In Rhode Island, the doctrine empowers and obligates 
the state, as trustee, to manage submerged lands (including those on private 
holdings )96 to protect the scenic, recreational, and ecological trust values 
that would be lost were the targeted wetlands filled for development. 97 The 
State had first argued that the public trust doctrine prevented it from 
granting the permission Palazzolo sought in its 1999 brief to the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court,98 before certiorari was granted to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The Rhode Island court was thus comfortable in applying the 
antecedent "background principles" analysis suggested in Lucas to find that 
the rights Palazzolo claimed were "not part of his title to begin with," and 
that as a result, nothing has been taken from him when the state denied his 
subsequent permit applications. 99 
At this point in its analysis, the court thus flirted with the Lucas No 
Stick Taken defense, finding that, as part of the background principles of 
90 Palazzolo v. State. 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *26. 
91 Jd. at *26-27 (citing Shively v. Bowlby. 152 US 1 (1894)). 
92 Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois. 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Shively, 152 U.S. at 15. 
93 Palazzolo v. State. 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *28 (noting the public trust doctrine is 
incorporated in the R.I. CoNS I. art. 1. § 17). 
94 See. e.g.. Champlin's Realty Assoc. L.P. v. Tillson. 823 A.2d 1162 (R.I. 2003); Warren v. 
Thornton-Whitehouse. 740 A.2d 1255 (R.I. 1999). 
95 Palazzolo v. State, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108 at *29 (citing Warren. 740 A.2d at 1255, 
1259-60). 
96 See. e.g.. Champlin's Realty Assocs. L.P.. 823 A.2d at 1167 (holding that the State can 
cede trust resource ownership while retaining rights and powers under the public trust 
doctrine). 
97 See Michelle A. Ruberto & Kathleen A. Ryan. The Public Trust Doctrine and Legislative 
Regulation in Rhode Island.· A Legal Framework Providing Greater Access to Coastal 
Resources in the Ocean State. 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 353. 378-379 (1990). 
98 Brief of Defendant-Appellees at *34. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. No. 98-333A (R.I. 1999), 
WL 34749043. 
99 Palazzolo v. State. 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *24-25 (citing Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1027). 
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state law, the public trust doctrine so governed the acquisition of property 
rights in Rhode Island that Palazzolo's bundle had never included a stick 
that would empower him to fill those wetlands without sovereign 
permission. 100 Moreover, the doctrine makes clear that such permission 
would not be forthcoming if the proposal would compromise trust values. 101 
Thus, when permission was refused, Palazzolo should not have been 
surprised- and he certainly could not claim that the state had frustrated any 
"reasonable expectations."102 However, the court conceded uncertainty 
regarding whether the No Stick Taken defense may be applied outside the 
scope of a Lucas total wipeout claim, leaving this part of its analysis 
vulnerable to challenge. 103 Other courts104 and commentators105 have 
reasoned that the underlying logic of what this piece calls the "No Stick 
Taken" defense must apply to any kind of takings challenge, because 
whether the property right claimed violated was actually owned by the 
claimant should not hinge on whether the claim is one for total or partial 
deprivation of economic use. Nevertheless, the Rhode Island court 
acknowledged this potential problem - but found it unnecessary to resolve 
in light of its third ground for decision. 106 
C. Penn Central, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Property Owner's 
Reasonable Expectations 
Most significant for submerged lands disputes like the marsh island 
bridge controversy is the court's third analysis, by which it found no taking 
under the Penn Central balancing test notwithstanding the first two grounds 
for defeat of Palazzolo's claim. 107 The regulation survived scrutiny under the 
"character of the government action" inquiry, since the permit was denied 
based on the State's interpretation of a neutral rule of general applicability 
that did not unduly single out Palazzolo. 108 In addition, the court held that 
the "economic impact" inquiry undermined Palazzolo's claim, finding that 
the regulation's foreclosure of wetland development was actually more 
100 Id at *57. 
101 Jd at *27 (citing Shively. 152 U.S. at 57-58). 
102 Id 
103 Id at *25-26. 
104 See. e.g.. Blumm & Ritchie. supra note 68. at 327 n.28 (listing decisions from the Sixth 
and Federal Circuits so holding). 
105 See. e.g.. id at 327; DOUGLAS T. KENDALL ET AL .• TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK: 
DEFENDING TAKINGS CHALLENGES To LAND USE REGULATIONS 117 (2000) (recognizing that 
the background principles defense applies to all inverse condemnation claims). 
106 Palazzolo v. State. 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *57-59. 
101 Id 
108 Id at *36. 
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likely to enhance the overall value of the property than reduce it. 109 Finally, 
the court found that the regulation did not interfere with reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations, because, once again, Palazzolo had no 
reasonable investment-backed expectations. 110 But its reasoning here 
departed from its similar conclusion earlier, on three grounds. 
First, the court concluded that ample evidence existed to put a 
reasonable investor on notice that this property was not likely to yield a 
profitable land venture, such that no investor should have developed 
reasonable expectations of the sort Palazzolo claimed. m After all, previous 
investors had clearly realized that the large acreage of wetlands on this 
parcel would subject any development proposal to the uncertainties of 
seeking dredge and fill permission, and had left this parcel on the market 
long after all neighboring parcels had been purchased from the original 
owner. 112 As the court noted, "Constitutional takings law does not 
compensate bad business decisions."113 Second, the court cited evidence 
from early in the proceedings that Palazzolo himself knew the investment 
was unlikely to be very successful, having testified at trial that of all the lots 
for sale in the vicinity, he knew that he had purchased "the worst of them," 
and the last of them to sell. 114 The court reasoned that he could not have 
suffered interference with reasonable expectations if even he did not expect 
much from this particular investment. 115 
But most important for our purposes, the court held that the public trust 
doctrine, as part of the State of Rhode Island's background law of property, 
precluded Palazzolo from ever forming reasonable expectations that he 
would be able to fill wetlands such as these. 116 The court applied reasoning 
similar to that underlying its second alternative holding, but here in a robust 
context immune from any vulnerability associated with applying the Lucas 
109 The court made this determination based on evidence forecasting that Palazzolo could 
expect a lower return on investment if he undertook the expensive prospect of developing 
even the wetland lots than he could expect from developing only the upland parcels (and 
reaping the higher prices they would command overlooking an undeveloped marsh than they 
would overlooking a residential subdivision). !d. at *45-46. 
110 Id. at *59. 
111 Id. at *51-56. 
112 Palazzolo v. State. 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *51. 
113 Id at *52. 
114 Id. at *49. 
115 Jd. at *50 (''The third prong of the Penn Central analysis ... clearly requires a 
determination of realistically achievable economic goals.'"). 
116 Id *25. 
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No Stick Taken defense in a Penn Central partial taking context. 117 The 
State's background principles of law determine which sticks- which rights 
- Palazzolo acquired when he took title to the land, and accordingly, 
informed his reasonable expectations about the extent of those rights. 118 The 
framing ofPalazzolo's expectations around the background principle ofthe 
public trust doctrine fits squarely within the third factor of the Penn Central 
test, 119 even if the No Stick Taken defense has not yet been approved by the 
U.S. Supreme Court to stand as an independent ground on which to deny a 
partial takings claim. The Penn Central analysis requires consideration of 
the owner's reasonable expectations, 120 and the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
easily concluded that the State's strong public trust doctrine foreclosed the 
very formation of reasonable expectations in this case. 121 
The Palazzolo remand does not suggest a unifYing theory to define 
"background prirlciples" generally, nor does it establish what properly 
informs an owner's "reasonable expectations" in all cases, but it does 
provide meaningful guidance to states, owners, and the courts that mediate 
their claims over the legal boundaries between public and private interests in 
coastal and wetland areas. 122 The Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence has 
given us a tool with which to think about an important aspect of private 
rights that requires protection against public incursion, which are the 
investments that owners make in reasonable reliance on the background 
prirlciple of state law. While it remains unclear exactly how deep legal rules 
must run before they earn a place among these principles, the public trust 
doctrine - long received as common law in most states and often adopted 
constitutionally as well123 - is easily among them. The public trust doctrine 
establishes a set of sticks in submerged land that remain held by the 
public, 124 even when the others in the bundle are taken privately. And when 
111 Id 
118 Palazzolo v. State. 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *25. 
119 Id at *24-25. 
120 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City ofNew York. 438 U.S. 104. 124 (1978). 
121 Palazzolo v. State. 2005 Rl Super LEXIS 108 at *24-25. 
122 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 627. 
123 See Ryan. supra note 2, at 478-79. 
124 Some commentators have expressed anxiety that the public trust doctrine may be too 
amorphous - too dangerously vulnerable to expansion - to be entrusted among the 
background principles of state law. See. e.g.. Barton Thompson. Jr., Robert E. Paradise 
Professor ofNatural Resources. Stanford Law School. Keynote Address at the University of 
South Carolina School of Law Southeastern Environmental Law Journal Symposium: 
Bridging the Divide: Public and Private Interests in Coastal Marshes and Marsh Islands 
(Sept. 7. 2006) available at http://www.law.sc.edu/elj/2006symposium/ (last visited Feb. 4, 
2006). Nevertheless. as the common law trust remains almost universally rooted in 
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the public exercises the rights represented by these sticks, nothing has been 
taken. 
IV. PALAZZOLO, MCQUEEN, AND THE MARSH ISLAND BRIDGE 
CONTROVERSY 
The Palazzolo remand is highly suggestive of how the third prong of a 
partial regulatory taking claim under the marsh island bridge guidelines- or, 
indeed, under any wetland or tideland protective regulation - might be 
entertained in a state with a strong public trust doctrine, such as South 
Carolina. 
As a Rhode Island case, the Palazzolo remand is not binding in South 
Carolina, but similarities between coastal management issues and the strong 
articulations of the public trust doctrine in both states make it persuasive 
precedent. Like Rhode Island, South Carolina has a rich tradition of the 
public trust doctrine, both at common law125 and constitutionally. 126 Rhode 
Island's constitutional statement of the public trust doctrine127 is more 
explicitly protective of ecological concerns than South Carolina's, which 
stresses protection for navigability values, 128 but the South Carolina 
Supreme Court has interpreted the doctrine to protect considerations also 
including "marine life, water quality, and public access" relating to trust 
resources. 
129 Even this distinction may be of little practical consequence in 
this discussion, since tideland bridges could interfere with both ecological 
and navigational values. 
application to submerged lands even after decades of attempts to expand its scope, see Ryan, 
supra note 2. at 490. such anxiety may be unwarranted. 
125 See. e.g.. State v. Pac. Guano Co .. 22 S.C. 50 (S.C. 1883); Cape Romaine Land & 
Improvement Co. v. Ga.-Car. Canning Co .. 148 S.C. 428 (S.C. 1926); State v. Hardee, 193 
S.E.2d 497 (S.C. 1972). 
126 S.C. CaNST. art. XIV. §4; S.C. Code Ann. §49-1-20 (2005). The language from the South 
Carolina Constitution reads: ''[a]ll navigable waters shall forever remain public highways free 
to the citizens of the State and the United States without tax. impost or toll imposed; and no 
tax. impost or wharfage shall be imposed ... unless the same be authorized by the General 
Assembly.'" Id 
127 R.I. CONST. art. 1. § 17. 
128 S.C. CaNST. art. XIV. §4 (stating ''all navigable waters shall forever remain public 
highways ... .'"). 
129 Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Associates. 456 S.E. 2d 397 (S.C. 1995); See also McQueen 
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116. 119 (S.C. 2003) (finding restricting development of 
artificial tidelands was not a compensable taking as a result of the limits of the public trust 
doctrine). cert. denied, McQueen v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 540 U.S. 982 
(2003). 
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In addition, analogous No Stick Taken reasoning was recently employed 
by the South Carolina Supreme Court in McQueen v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 130 a case in which an owner brought and lost a true Lucas 
takings claim. The McQueen case, which followed Palazzolo to the 
Supreme Court before its remand back to South Carolina, makes a jump by 
the No Stick Taken rationale from the Lucas to the Penn Central context 
perhaps inevitable. 
A. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
In McQueen, an owner had purchased two contiguous lots on manmade 
saltwater canals in Myrtle Beach with the hopes of developing them for 
residential purposes. 131 Continuous erosion of the property caused the 
majority to revert to tidelands and critical area saltwater wetlands. 132 When 
McQueen filed applications with the State to backfill his lots to make them 
solid enough to support structures, there was already insufficient high 
ground to develop anything at all. 133 The State denied his request to backfill 
the lots because doing so would permanently destroy the critical areas that 
had been established by the natural process of erosion, even though the 
waterways were originally manmade. 134 McQueen claimed a categorical 
taking under Lucas, since the remaining high ground was insufficient in size 
to enable any economically viable development at all. 135 
Although McQueen prevailed in a lower court, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court reversed, finding that no taking had occurred because the 
wetlands regulations that pre-dated McQueen's title prevented him from 
forming reasonable expectations with which the subsequent permit denials 
could have interfered. 136 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and then 
remanded to South Carolina for further consideration in light of its holding 
in Palazzolo that pre-existing regulations were not dispositive of the 
question whether an owner could have formed reasonable expectations with 
which the state had unduly interfered. 137 
130 580 S.E.2d 119. 
131 Id. at 117. 
132 Id. at 118. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119. 
136 Id. at 118. 
137 Id. at 118-119. 
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On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court again found no taking, 
and like the Palazzolo remand, in light of the public trust doctrine. 138 Under 
South Carolina's public trust doctrine, it reasoned, the state holds 
presumptive title to tidelands and land below the mean high water mark as 
trustee for the public benefit. 139 Under South Carolina law, wetlands created 
by the encroachment of navigable waters belongs to the State and proof that 
this encroachment of water occurred after the time of grant does not defeat 
the title. 140 As a result, the reversion to tidelands effected a restriction on 
McQueen's property rights inherent in the ownership of all property 
bordering tidal water in the State of South Carolina. 141 The court thus 
applied the No Stick Taken defense in an unassailable Lucas context: no 
stick had been taken from McQueen, reasoned the court, because the lost 
right to fill was one that had never been part of his bundle under the 
background principles of South Carolina property law. 142 
Reference to the public trust doctrine, which first appeared in Palazzolo 
in the State's brief to the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 1999143, appeared 
in the McQueen litigation relatively later, in the State's brief to the South 
Carolina Supreme Court in 2002. 144 Whether or not it was the highly visible 
nature of the Palazzolo litigation that suggested the possibility of relying on 
the public trust doctrine in McQueen, the use of the No Stick Taken 
rationale in the McQueen remand, 145 taken together with the analogous 
reasonable expectations reasoning in the Palazzolo remand, 146 suggests 
another formidable defense against any takings claims raised by disgruntled 
marsh island bridge applicants. 
138 Id at 120. 
139 Jd. (citing State v. Yelsen Land Co., 216 S.E. 2d 876 (S.C. 1975) (extending public trust 
doctrine presumptive title by state from lands below the high water mark to include 
tidelands)). 
140 Jd (citing Coburg Dairy Inc. v. Lesser, 458 S.E. 2d 547 (S.C. 1995); State v. Fain, 259 
S.E. 2d 606 (S.C. 1979)). 
141 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119-120. 
142 Id 
143 Brief of Defendant-Appellees. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. No. 98-333A at * 11 (R.I. 1999), 
WL 34749043. 
144 Brief of Petitioner. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council. No. 94-CP-26-3154 at 17 (S.C. 
2003) (No. 256642). 
145 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119-120. 
146 Palazzolo v. State. No. 88-0297. 2005 RI. Super LEXIS 108 at *25 (R.I. Super. July 5, 
2005). 
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B. Implications for the Marsh Island Bridge Controversy 
South Carolina's public trust doctrine easily falls within the background 
principles of state property law. 147 Perhaps most notorious is the long line of 
public trust cases extending as far back as the 1880s establishing that 
ownership of tidelands and marsh islands rests presumptively with the state, 
and can only be shown to have transferred to private owners by their 
presentation of an express grant. 148 This, then, is a doctrine that requires 
South Carolinians to prove a chain of title extending all the way back to the 
King of England to avoid potential divestment to the state of ownership 
interests claimed in a marsh island. 149 Thus, perhaps even more than in most 
states, the reasonable expectations of South Carolina marsh island owners 
must be tempered by knowledge of the doctrine as among the background 
principles of state law. 
In this way, the South Carolina public trust doctrine forecloses any 
reasonable expectations by an island owner of a protected legal right to lay a 
bridge over public tidelands. Permission to build a bridge through public 
tidelands can only take place at the discretion of the State, which owns and 
manages public tidelands for the public benefit. 150 Allowing too many 
bridges to be built in the tidelands could seriously undermine the state's 
obligations as trustee, and so a successful application for a bridge permit can 
never be presumed; there is always a reasonable chance that a permit might 
be denied. Accordingly, in the Penn Central analysis we began above in 
Part II, the third prong of the test would be equally unkind to a disappointed 
bridge permit applicant seeking compensation for economic loss associated 
with a permit denial. Even if the "character of the government action" and 
"economic impact" inquiries were not dispositive of such a claim (despite 
strong arguments that they should be), 151 the State would almost certainly 
prevail on the "expectations" inquiry by showing that the South Carolina 
public trust doctrine has always foreclosed any possible reasonable 
expectations by property owners that their bundles included a "bridge stick," 
or right of automotive access. 
This analysis may disappoint some owners, but the result should not be 
surprising, especially when analogized to like circumstances. Although 
homebuilder Ted Mamunes lamented that his island "is useless if [he] can't 
147 See generally Pac. Guano Co .. 22 S.C. at 84 (1883); see also Hardee. 193 S.E.2d 497; 
Rice Hope Plantation v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth .. 59 S.E.2d 132 (S.C. 1950). 
148 See cases cited supra note 147. 
149 See generally Pac. Guano Co., 22 S.C. at 50. 
150 See McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118-119. 
151 See discussion supra Part II. C. 
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get to it,"152 we've already established that this is unlikely, and that we can 
better understand his complaint as one that his island, sans bridge, is 
difficult to get to, and thus less valuable than it might become if it were 
more conveniently accessible by cars. But indeed, the same is true of all 
inconveniently located property, which might command higher property 
values if only access were somehow made easier. For owners like Mr. 
Mamunes, the relevant question becomes: to what extent should the State 
subsidize individual owners of inconveniently located property? For 
example: 
• Could a shop owner whose property exists on the far side of an 
interstate assert a right to build a bridge across the interstate to a 
bustling economic area, just because it will make her store more 
profitable? (Not likely.) 
• Would a landowner with property on the far side of a public park 
preserved for scenic views, habitat, and public recreation be allowed 
to pave a driveway through the park, so as to procure more 
convenient access to the rest of town? (Probably not.) 
• Accordingly, should an owner of a small island reasonably expect 
that the state owes her permission to build a bridge through 
tidelands preserved in a natural state for public trust benefits 
associated with navigation, marine life, water quality, and public 
access and recreation? 
The best basis for any such expectation in this last example might 
simply be that similarly situated owners on other islands have been able to 
build the bridges they wanted, implying that later-applying owners should 
be able to count on similar bridges as well. But this is a classic problem in 
land use management, frequently arising in the case of new zoning 
regulations, where early acting owners' land uses do not ensure similar 
permission for later acting owners. 153 By analogy, if a bridge that would not 
receive approval under the new guidelines is already in place, it is a prior 
non-conforming use that may continue, even though later permits for similar 
bridges may be denied. 154 If a bridge that would not receive approval under 
152 Jordan. supra note 21, at Fl. 
153 See generally 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning §§ 555-627 (2006) (discussing the 
general rules of zoning and exceptions for prior non-conforming uses. variances, and vested 
rights); see also Bradford W. Wyche. An Overview of Land Use Regulation in South 
Carolina. 11 SOUIHEASTERNENVTL. L.J. 183 (2003). 
154 See Zoning and Planning. supra note 153. at § 555 C'A nonconforming use is a structure 
or other use prohibited by the zoning regulations. but permitted because it existed when the 
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the new guidelines was substantially on the way to being built before they 
went into effect, then that owner probably has the truly "reasonable, 
investment-backed expectation" that warrants an exception along the lines 
of a vested right. 155 But the simple fact that an owner always thought she'd 
be able to do it later because others had done so earlier holds little weight in 
the zoning context, and should similarly hold little weight in the permitting 
of marsh island bridges. 
Still, none of this means that South Carolina should be completely 
unconcerned with owners' reasonable, investment-backed expectations 
when setting coastal land use regulations. There remain good policy-based 
reasons to consider such expectations - the same policy-based reasons that 
underlie their inclusion in the Penn Central balancing test in the first place. 
In some cases, such as those involving claims for bridge infrastructure by 
owners systematically denied infrastructure for invidiously discriminatory 
reasons at a time when other groups were so rewarded, 156 perhaps the State 
should affirmatively exercise its discretion to build a bridge in spite of 
competing considerations. These questions remain due for consideration in 
the ad hoc, case-by-case fashion that regulations affecting land - the least 
fungible of all resources- have always required. 157 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the state may choose to consider the investment-backed 
expectations of landowners in making decisions about who should get a 
permit to build a bridge in public tidelands, and perhaps it should weigh that 
consideration more heavily in some cases than others. However, takings law 
does not require it in Rhode Island and South Carolina, where the public 
trust doctrine precludes owners from ever forming such "reasonable 
expectations" as a legal matter. Taken together, the Palazzolo and McQueen 
remands suggest that takings liability relating to regulations like the Rhode 
Island wetlands program and the South Carolina marsh island bridge 
regulations were adopted.'"); Gurganios v. City of Beaufort 454 S.E.2d 912. 918 (S.C. App. 
1995) (noting that ''a property owner has a constitutionally protected right to continue the use 
following enactment of a zoning ordinance'' as a nonconforming use) 
155 See Vulcan Materials Co. v. Greenville. 536 S.E. 2d 892. 901-902 (S.C. App. 2000) 
(finding that Vulcan. by spending nearly $2 million and removing overburden in preparation 
for building before the property was rezoned. established a vested right to the development 
plan); see also Wyche. supra note 153. 
156 See Faith R Rivers. Preserving Heirs' Property Along the Gullah Coast, 15 
SOUIHEASTERNENVTL. L.J. 147 (2006). 
157 See Erin Ryan. Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in 
Land Use Planning Conflicts. 7 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 337. 338 (2002). 
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guidelines will be limited. Any such claims will fail under the Penn Central 
regulatory takings balancing test- if not under the "character" or "impact" 
inquiries, then at least for lack of "reasonable expectations," crafted in light 
of the background principle of the public trust doctrine. 
But the significance of these decisions extends far beyond the state lines 
of Rhode Island and South Carolina. The public trust doctrine has been 
received at common law in nearly all of the States, and many have elevated 
its principles to their constitutions in recognition of the importance of 
preserving the critical public commons protected by the trust. 158 Whenever 
these states regulate land uses to protect public trust values associated with 
the wetlands, tidelands, lakes, and rivers that are the subject of the doctrine, 
they are regulating uses long withdrawn from the realm of purely private 
interest by the very "background principles" of state law that govern the 
takings inquiry. Claims for compensable takings under environmental 
regulations designed to protect tidelands and wetlands - like the lawsuits 
brought by David Lucas and Anthony Palazzolo - will likely wane in 
number as they become harder to win, delighting environmental advocates 
at the chagrin of property rights advocates. The implications of recognizing 
the public trust doctrine in these terms are just beginning to be felt in Rhode 
Island and South Carolina, but they will surely reverberate across the nation 
in the ongoing legal contemplation of the enduring tension between public 
and private interests in submerged lands. 
158 See. e.g.. CAL. DEP'I OF WATER REs .. BULL. No. 160-98, CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN 
UPDATE app. at 2A-2 (1998). available at http://rubicon.water.ca.gov/pdfs/vllv1ap2a.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 4. 2007). ''In a majority of states. the public trust doctrine requires the state 
to hold navigable waters. the submerged lands underneath. and adjacent lands below the 
ordinary high water mark in trust for the public.'" Stephanie Showalter. No Right to Walk 
between High Water Mark and Water's Edge. The National Sea Grant Law Center (Oct. 31, 
2006). http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/National/SandBar/3.2beach.htm (last visited Feb. 
4. 2007). Most western states have now codified the doctrine. See Michael Blumm & Thea 
Schwartz. Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 4 IssUEs IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP. 12. 37 (2003). available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss4/ (last visited Feb. 
4. 2007) (''The public trust in water now extends to at least a half dozen Western states -
California. North Dakota. Idaho. Washington. Montana. and Alaska- and probably to Oregon 
as well. New Mexico and Wyoming have longstanding public access rights to both navigable 
and nonnavigable waters which could ripen into recognition of the public trust in water.'"). 
Most state constitutions also declare that water and other resources are held in trust for the 
public. Id at 13. n. 97. For a list of state constitution sections that mention the public trust 
doctrine. see Matthew Thor Kirsch. Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 
Dun: L. J. 1169. 1176 n.19 (1997). 
